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Abstract
Since December 2019, the world is potentially facing one of the most difficult infectious situations of the last
decades. COVID-19 epidemic warrants consideration as a mass casualty incident (MCI) of the highest nature. An
optimal MCI/disaster management should consider all four phases of the so-called disaster cycle: mitigation,
planning, response, and recovery. COVID-19 outbreak has demonstrated the worldwide unpreparedness to face a
global MCI.
This present paper thus represents a call for action to solicitate governments and the Global Community to actively
start effective plans to promote and improve MCI management preparedness in general, and with an obvious
current focus on COVID-19.
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“Have I missed the mark, or, like true archer, do I strike
my quarry? Or am I prophet of lies, a babbler from door
to door?” (Cassandra in “Agamemnon,” Aeschylus)
“Things are now as they are;
they will be fulfilled in what is fated;
neither burnt sacrifice nor libation
of offerings without fire
will soothe intense anger away.”
(“Agamemnon,” Aeschylus)
Background
Since December 2019, the world is potentially facing one
of the most difficult infectious situations of the last de-
cades [1]. Hundreds of thousands of patients are suffer-
ing from COVID-19 infection with millions more at risk,
who are presenting to the attention of the medical
personnel inside and outside the hospitals. In some loca-
tions, almost 10% of cases have presented with severe re-
spiratory impairment necessitating of intensive care.
Despite intensive life support, however, many of the sick
have died of this new respiratory viral infection. Beyond
fatalities, a greater percentage necessitated admission to
hospitals for diagnosis and treatment. Sanitary systems
of different parts of the world are in great troubles, and
some of them are at risk of collapsing under this infec-
tious emergency due to discrepancies between system
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resilience and an overwhelming number of patients re-
quiring attention.
Main text
The American College of Emergency Physicians
(ACEP) has defined a disaster or a mass casualty inci-
dent (MCI) as occurring “when the destructive effects
of natural or man-made forces overwhelm the ability
of a given area or community to meet the demand
for health care” [3].
The main features of a disaster/MCI are as follows:
 It interrupts the normal functioning of a
community.
 It exceeds the coping mechanisms (capacity) of the
community.
 External assistance is often needed to return to
normal functioning of a community [4].
Generally, an MCI conjures up imagery linked to a
scene of catastrophic and impressive events either nat-
ural or man-made. This typically involves patients who
are severely injured, bleeding, and screaming, brought to
the hospital by emergency services, relatives, or Good
Samaritans simply trying to help. This is not what the
COVID-19 pandemic looks like.
Patients are coming to the hospital autonomously,
generally as flu-like sick patients with sometimes cough
and fever or other undefined often mild respiratory
symptoms.
This situation generated some confusion and under-
estimation of the real weight of the problem, in the very
first days. However, it is becoming clearer that the di-
mension of the issue may potentially be catastrophic if
not correctly managed. Thus, the COVID-19 epidemic
warrants consideration as a MCI of the highest nature.
Principles of MCI management present fundamental
rules to be followed in order to face something that by
definition is almost unmanageable [2–4].
MCIs are classified by levels, based on the number of
potential victims generated [5] by
the event:
 Level 1: 1–10 potential victims
 Level 2: 11–30 potential victims
 Level 3: 31–50 potential victims
 Level 4: 51–200 potential victims
 Level 5: more than 200 victims
 Level 6: long-term operational period(s)
 The authors however propose that the worst-case
scenario for COVID-19 exponentially exceeds any
level previously conceptualized and that a level be-
yond 6 might be considered.
Alternatively, MCI can be classified even considering
the entity of the response [4]—in terms
of resources—required to face them:
 Level I: requires local emergency response personnel
and organizations to contain and deal effectively
with the disaster and its aftermath.
 Level II: requires regional efforts and mutual aid
from surrounding communities.
 Level III: is of such a magnitude that local and
regional assets are overwhelmed, requiring national
assistance.
 Level IV: sometimes included in level III; this MCI is
of such magnitude that it requires international
assistance and resources.
 Again, the authors however propose that the worst-
case scenario for COVID-19 would require re-
sources that may also exceed the capabilities of
international assistance and resources, such that glo-
bal cooperation becomes practically impossible. Even
the wealthiest most altruistic countries may face
their own MCI situations and be unable to provide
the basic necessities to their own citizens.
Regardless of the classification systems of the event,
some cornerstones of management exist and have been
precisely defined based on several previous MCI events.
An optimal MCI/disaster management should con-
sider all four phases of the so-called disaster cycle: miti-
gation, planning, response, and recovery [3]. Particular
attention on certain aspects of the cycle must be given
in order to adapt the action to the MCI faced. On the
other hand, the unbalanced attention posed on only one
aspect may increase the harmful impact of events.
These four phases are as follows:
1. Mitigation: Some of the devastating effects of MCI
may be reduced before the event. In fact, useful
measures may be posed in action in the affected
region before the event happening, in all those
events that can be preventable or are realistically
announced (i.e., economic and political attempt to
mitigate MCI effect local, regional, and national
hospital and infrastructure reorganization, activities
and personnel redistribution, material supplying,
patient and people advising).
2. Planning: A realistic disaster plans involve exercise,
practice, and continuous revision. In the
impossibility to plan for all contingencies, plans
must be relatively general and expandable but must
be present. Mutual aid agreements or contracts
among existing area associations, institutions, and
nations (in a wider context of international entities,
i.e., unions or federations) must be established
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before an actual event, in order to plan and
optimize available resources as well as planning for
funding and reimbursement. Most medical entities
have not anticipated this pandemic, and therefore,
planning must begin immediately and the response
escalated according to the changing levels of
demand/compromise.
3. Response: This phase is generally considered the
most important one, but effective and coordinated
response greatly depends on the other three phases.
The main aspects of the response phase may be
summarized as follows:
–– Activation, notification, and initial response:
Organizations and personnel involved in response
and the potentially affected populations should be
notified through effective and trust worth
communication channels without generating panic
and mass unreasonable and risky behaviors.
As well, the different structures must be advised in
time and in an appropriate manner to allow them
to allocate the necessary resources and to free the
necessary beds and rooms to host the sick patients.
All these things must be prepared as much as
possible before the first wave of sick patients’
arrival.
–– Organization of command and scene assessment:
Establishing a command structure is one of the
most crucial steps. This must be prearranged and
assembled almost immediately, as well as
communication nets established. The Incident
Command System (ICS) is the only that is in charge
to direct and organize the different actions in the
affected regions. All different regions or local
directors are not allowed to manage the event
differently from what defined by the ICS.
–– Search and rescue
–– Extrication, triage, stabilization, and transport:
Triage involves providing the most efficient aid to
as many as possible and prioritizes victims’
treatment, transport, and/or transfer. Many
variables influence the manner in which patients
are triaged, transported, and treated: kind of
incident, victim number, resources available,
infrastructure capability, and the disaster context.
Errors in triaging lead to worse outcomes. Health
care providers must be familiar with MCI triage
concept and trained in performing it. Transport
must equitably distribute victims to capable
receiving facilities.
On the other side, the different structures must be
familiar with the necessity of resource allocation
during MCI which are deeply different from the
normal activity. Operating principles for those
charged with performing triage must be established
a priori, agreed upon by the health authorities and
society, and especially transparent to the general
public. In a true MCI, the greatest good must be
provided to the greatest number of patients. When
there is a 10 to 1 ratio of those in need of life-
supporting technologies versus available infrastruc-
ture, the sickest may unfortunately be denied care
and moved into an expectant category.
–– Definitive scene management
Unique aspect of the pandemic—Surgeons and some
ultra-specialistic branches of health system provide
a unique service that cannot be performed by other
medical disciplines. Therefore, all of them must be
secured in a protected environment, minimizing
risks of acquiring the disease because critically ill
and injured patients will continue to need emergent
care.
4. Recovery: This last phase is crucial for the affected
community. Management of the involved personnel
is very important during this phase for critical
stress debriefing. Debriefing may teach valuable
lessons. It is crucial to obtain as much information
as possible from all actively involved participants. If
complete and objective criticality analysis is not
performed, improvements in future responses are
impossible [3].
Even without a more in-depth analysis of MCI
management is self-evident that management of the
COVID-19 outbreak has demonstrated the worldwide
unpreparedness to face a global MCI especially if
“unconventional.” According to the stratification and
grading systems, this COVID-19 event is beyond even
the most serious and demanding of the levels (i.e., level
6 or level IV). The number of expected victims in fact is
enormous, and the resources necessitated are near be-
yond imagination, never mind current infrastructure.
This means that the effort and the attention must be
at maximum level. No discount could be done to not
pay too high price in term of human lives, or in the
worst scenario of system collapse. Not only the sanitary
and organizational system is affected, but all the differ-
ent national economic, political, and infrastructural sides
are in challenge. The absolute anomaly of this MCI is
the velocity and the “unconventional” diffusion and
presentation. Given the consequences which are almost
unimaginable, management may better default to estab-
lished principles fully ascribable to an MCI, with re-
sponses managed accordingly. Simply put, it is impossible
for the world to face such a potentially catastrophic sce-
nario without a well-organized and prepared system.
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However, an analysis of the actual characteristics fea-
tures of the early responses may provoke many
criticisms:
 Lack of effective presence of national and
international agencies for disaster management and
of international communication, collaboration, and
support. In reality, international organizations in
charge in disease prevention and control have
published quickly protocols and guidelines
(sometimes conflicting with each other as in the
case of protective masks for health workers), but
they have been implemented very slowly at national
level. The lack of coordination of the activities
between and within the international and national
levels was evident in the first phase.
 Lack of mitigation phase during which many
strategies may have been posed into action to
reduce the real impact of the infection on the
different systems. Taking into account the evolution
of Chinese cases and the progressive spread within
the world, there would have been time to organize a
mitigation phase.
 Lack of an effective action planning at international
and national level. The action plans have
progressively followed. Probably, a well-structured
action plan aimed at containing a potential disaster
would have created fewer difficulties in managing
COVID-19.
 Lack of national central directed strategies to
prevent infection transmission and to timely isolate
the more severely affected regions. The epidemic
initially spread to those countries that are probably
less virtuous in infection prevention and control. In
these countries, the problem was handled by
policymakers and technicians who did not perceive
the real potential of this emergency.
 Lack of trust worth and objective information to the
potential affected people given from the very
beginning. The information was immediately
conflicting, and social networks giving voice to
everyone, which complicated the information
transmission chain.
 Lack of a pre-defined disaster management plan in-
cluding the need to prevent infected people from en-
tering the emergency departments and to place the
triage systems outside the emergency departments
from the beginning of the infection outbreak. An in-
fective emergency scenario, such as the present one,
can repeat itself. In the coming months, the WSES
will try to organize courses which will teach the
concept of MCI to infectious disease emergencies,
involving all interested professions. In fact, WSES
has among its members medical and health
professionals from different countries of the whole
world who are monitoring and helping to develop
actions to prevent and control this pandemic event.
As most of them attend emergency areas in hospi-
tals, they are professionals who are also at risk of
contracting the disease, and at that moment, no
matter the specialty or qualification of each one,
they must all be united and focused on fighting this
disease.
 The need to monitor the data on number of patients
with related diagnoses before the first case of a
patient with this type of disease is identified. If there
are anomalies, then specific actions should be taken
to identify the cause of this variation. It is essential
to avoid any delays in identifying patient 0 or the
first patients with this disease.
 Thousands of health care workers have been
infected amid the ongoing coronavirus outbreak, a
sign of the immensely difficult working conditions
for doctors, nurses, and health care workers in
general. They should be instead among those best
protected. The infections, along with the deaths of
several doctors in China, underscore the deeply
challenging, chaotic environment that health care
workers face with when toiling on the front lines of
an epidemic outbreak. They face long hours,
changing protocols, potential medical supply
shortages, and risks to their own personal health
and that of their loved ones. In every mass casualty
event, the health care workers who go to the
forefront are the main actors. The lack of national
and international action plans forced health workers
to work in a situation of extreme unsafety.
While greatly concerning, these findings should not be
surprising. In previous surveys by the World Society of
Emergency Surgery (WSES) conducted in 2015 [6] and
the report of the National Association of Emergency
Medical Technicians (NAEMT) published in 2017 [7],
the most medical and disaster response systems are ac-
tually unprepared to face MCI.
Despite these reports and the unfortunate but demon-
strative experiences of many countries, global prepared-
ness toward MCI is still not institutionalized by proper
management plans, promoted by governments, and nor
are health care personnel sufficiently trained for the
challenges likely to come [8–10].
COVID-19 clearly has demonstrated a double fold
message:
a) That current systems are vulnerable and extremely
weak in this era of rapid global travel in containing
an MCI that is paradoxically moving not so fast and
with not immediately life threating sick patients.
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b) As United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights Michelle Bachelet commented “Human
rights need to be front and center in response (...)
to effectively combat the outbreak means ensuring
everyone has access to treatment, and is not denied
health care because they cannot pay for it or
because of stigma (…)” [11].
As different social groups and local communities have
different and diverse understandings of scientific know-
ledge [12], the key to addressing such a global public
health outbreak could be adopting a uniform, evidence-
based approach [13] that puts public risk perception at
the center. Communities and individuals need to work
together along with academia and policymakers.
Sensitization and prevention measures are necessary.
However, there cannot be a one size fits all approach for
all countries. The expected health, security, and eco-
nomic benefits of measures need to be weighed against
any expected health, security, and economic costs, as
well as any “moral” costs intrinsic to coercion and com-
pulsion [14].
Conclusion
This present paper thus represents a call for action to
solicitate governments and the Global Community to ac-
tively start effective plans to promote and improve MCI
management preparedness in general, and with an obvi-
ous current focus on COVID-19. Global Health cannot
continue to proceed considering mass medical emergen-
cies extraordinary situations when they are part of the
natural course of things. As natural parts of the common
life, Global Health must be prepared to face them at the
best of our possibilities. Without considering even the
economic and political drawbacks, if actions will not be
promoted, with the onset of the next MCI, it can be pre-
vented that the number of affected and dead people will
be higher and higher.
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